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ABSTRACT 
Recent research highlights significant risks associated with health professionals working 
long hours – risks to their health and safety, to the safety and quality of care provided to 
patients and to public safety. This article undertakes a review of the various instruments 
used to regulate working hours in health systems, using six countries (Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and the European 
Union as primary comparators. The review demonstrates differences in the instruments 
used to regulate the issue in these countries and in the economic, social, and cultural 
factors that limit instrument choice and moderate instrument effectiveness. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent research highlights the significant risks associated with health professionals 
working long hours – risks to the health and safety of individual health professionals, to 
the safety and quality of care provided to their patients, to the public and to the system 
itself (see e.g., British Medical Association 1998, 1999). The significance and salience of 
this issue has resulted in a plethora of activity by policy actors who use a variety of 
governance strategies to limit the hours worked by health professionals. The nature and 
context of the health system renders this task a complex one, particularly when 
compared with other professions whose hours of work are limited by regulatory 
schemes. There are also serious and significant risks associated with the regulatory 
schemes used to reduce working hours in the health sector. The most serious and 
significant of these risks is that, despite the best intentions of the regulators, regulatory 
schemes may actually worsen patient safety at greater cost to the health system. As such, 
how policy actors regulate long hours in the health system is an issue that warrants 
specific study and analysis, both for its contributions to our theoretical knowledge and 
understanding of regulatory regimes and for the future development of issue specific 
regulation. 
 
To this end, this article reviews the instruments used by various policy actors to regulate 
working hours in health systems, using the configurations of instruments in six 
countries (Australia, Canada, Denmark, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States) and accordingly one supra-national body, the European Union, as 
primary comparators.1 In the first section, I outline the problems with long working 
hours in the health sector and associated regulatory challenges. In the second section, I 
examine the instruments used to regulate long working hours and briefly discuss their 
strengths and weaknesses. However, policy actors do not employ these instruments 
singly. Accordingly, in the third section, I examine the configurations of regulatory 
instruments employed to address this issue in the countries under review and assess the 
lessons from their implementation, as well as any factors that limit instrument 
effectiveness. The review demonstrates differences in the instruments used to regulate 
the issue in these countries and in the economic, social, and cultural factors that limit 
instrument choice and moderate instrument effectiveness. In the fourth section, I 
examine how many hours and in what configuration physicians-in-training may work, as 
established by regulation, in each country (or supra-national body). 
 
First, however, two comments. The governance approaches outlined in this article are 
ultimately very simple in their approach. Policy actors have framed the issue as follows: 
there are adverse consequences from health professionals working long hours, including 
negative effects on worker health and safety, the quality and safety of the health services 
                                                 
1 This research is part of a larger project that examined the governance of patient safety in six countries 
(Downie et al. 2006). The methods employed were a search of the literature, grey literature and legislation, 
regulation, contracts and collective agreements. Informational interviews with key agencies from the 
countries examined were also conducted to confirm instrument usage and impact. Research ethics approval 
was sought but the Research Ethics Office at Dalhousie University deemed that ethics review was not 
required. 
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provided to patients and on the safety of the general public. Therefore, a simple solution 
to improve health and safety for all is to reduce the hours worked by health 
professionals.2 Some professional groups, notably some nursing groups, contest this 
simple premise. In a nursing context, they argue it is not the number of hours worked 
that causes health and safety concerns for nurses and patients, but rather the demands 
placed on nurses within those hours. Put another way, nurses providing care to fewer 
patients, even if it is within a long working period, will best improve the well-being of 
nurses and patients. Thus, some nursing groups advocate nurse-to-patient ratios as a 
regulatory solution best able to improve safety (Buchan 2004). As the focus of this article 
is limitations on working hours for health professionals, nurse-to-patient ratios are not 
examined in this article, but such divisions in approach further demonstrate the 
complexities of regulating issues related to health and safety in health systems. 
 
Despite long working hours being an issue for many health professions, the analysis that 
follows focuses primarily on physicians, as concerns about physicians dominate 
discourse around this problem. The reasons for this are complex. The foundation of many 
modern health systems was a process where the medical profession, hospitals and the 
state accommodated each other’s needs in the public interest (Tuohy 1999) and therefore 
policy actors may be reflexively primed to address the needs of physicians above other 
health professional groups. Despite, or perhaps because of this status, physicians 
generally (although again not exclusively) are the locus of blame when things go wrong 
in the health system. The “malpractice crisis” throws into stark relief the needs of this 
group to mitigate litigation risks (Abraham 2002). Finally, physicians, especially those in 
training, have worked on average longer hours than other health professional groups for 
historically contingent reasons. 
 
 
II. THE WORKING HOURS PROBLEM 
 
Although in general the negative consequences of working long-hours are well known, 
until relatively recently there has been little context-specific analysis of the impact of 
long-working hours within health systems and for health professionals and patients. The 
impact of excessive working hours for health professionals include negative effects on 
their health and on their relationships with others, including family, friends, and 
colleagues (British Medical Association 1998, 1999). The empirical evidence supports the 
conclusion that the long working hours of many health professionals are an occupational 
health issue, if not an occupational safety issue (British Medical Association 1998, 1999). 
It also supports the conclusion that a reduction in working hours results in an 
improvement in health outcomes for health professionals (Scott and Deloitte Ltd 1987; 
Stamp et al.. 2005; Hutter et al.. 2006). 
 
                                                 
2 It is important to acknowledge that a reduction in the hours worked by health professionals is not the sole 
remedy for patient safety related issues in health systems. It is rather one solution among many proposed 
and initiated by policy actors. Examples of other strategies to improve patient safety include: in the U.S. a 
significant investment in research on safe clinical delivery and in the U.K. the introduction of a clinical 
governance framework. (See Downie et al. 2006). 
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The long working hours of health professionals also emerge as a causative factor of 
preventable unsafe treatment and care. The Institute of Medicine (IOM) (2004), 
amongst others, confirmed the significance of the issue in respect of patient safety 
concluding that long work hours pose one of the most serious safety risks, because 
fatigue slows reaction time, decreases energy, diminishes attention to detail, and 
otherwise contributes to errors. The IOM estimates that the annual national costs of 
unsafe health services in the U.S. health system are a minimum of $17 billion and perhaps 
98,000 lives (IOM 2000). There is little consensus as to whether regulation in this area is 
necessary as part of an occupational health and safety program, as one part of a broader 
initiative to improve the safety and quality of health services for patients, or whether 
regulation should address both concerns, an issue addressed in more detail later in this 
article. Placing limits on working hours also poses some more general regulatory 
challenges. For the purposes of analysis, I categorize these challenges as regulatory, 
professional, and resourcing issues. 
 
A. REGULATORY ISSUES 
Despite an apparent consensus around the need to reduce working hours, placing limits 
on working hours poses considerable regulatory challenges. The three regulatory 
challenges most closely considered in this research are: what are the appropriate time 
parameters within which health professionals should work; the effectiveness of 
regulation in improving occupational health and safety or patient safety; and which form, 
or forms, of regulation to use to address this issue. As to the first challenge, despite 
evidence that long working hours are problematic in terms of public safety and private 
well-being, researchers have not yet determined how many hours, or in what 
configuration, it is safe for health professionals to work. Policy-makers also struggle with 
this issue, resulting in significant differences between the maximum hours health 
professionals are supposed to work between each country or supra-national body, an 
issue discussed in more detail in the fourth section of this article and set out in Table 2 
(see Section V). 
 
As to the second challenge, research tends to confirm that a reduction in working hours 
provides better health outcomes for health professionals (see e.g., British Medical 
Association 1998, 1999). However, studies report conflicting outcomes of the impact of 
reducing working hours on patient safety. A 2004 meta-analysis noted that some studies 
concluded that errors reduced after working hours were limited, but other studies 
indicated no improvement or that error rates worsened (Fletcher 2004). The relationship 
between managing health professional fatigue whilst ensuring continuity of care and the 
safety of patients is complex. It carries with it the risk that any initiative to reduce the 
working hours of health professionals, whether to improve occupational health or to 
patient safety, may in fact compromise patient safety (Fischer 2004; Fletcher 2004; 
Brennan and Zinner 2003; British Medical Association 1999). 
 
As to the last challenge, as discussed in this article it is evident that there are a number of 
forms of regulation that regulators can and do use to address this issue. Differing 
motivations for regulation, that is whether the regulation attempts to address the issue 
as an occupational health and safety issue or as a patient safety issue, may provide an 
explanation for differences in instrument choice and policy direction. This explanation is 
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necessarily incomplete without an examination of the structural constraints within 
which regulators in this area operate. By structural constraints, I mean factors that relate 
to the economic, political, and cultural context that underpins regulation in each country 
or supra-national body. Some of these I describe below, but this research indicates that 
structural constraints also include factors specific to each country, such as membership 
in supra-national bodies or the design of the health care system in that country. 
 
B PROFESSIONAL ISSUES 
Health professionals are not a homogenous group and any attempt to reduce working 
hours must take account of different professional needs. Professions have different work 
patterns, as do specialist groups within those professions. Professionals also may work in 
dissimilar work environments, for example, acute care and primary care, and rural or 
urban care sites, with different demand and supply issues and different work patterns. 
 
These different needs also intersect with different professional cultures associated with 
the various healthcare professions. By culture, I mean the values that define 
professionalism in a particular profession. Changing a profession with an entrenched 
culture through regulatory means may be especially challenging, as regulatory strategies 
may fail if they overlook the subtleties of the behaviors and cultures of the regulated 
(Aiken & Sloane 2002). Many professions cling strongly to their professional autonomy 
and are resistant to external regulation of their practice (Eastman and Peay 1999). This 
culture includes a tradition of working long hours, most particularly those who work or 
train in the acute health sector. The medical profession has traditionally perceived the 
ability and willingness of a physician to work long hours as demonstrating commitment 
to the profession and to patients (Fischer 2004; Carpenter et al. 2006). In particular, 
society expects health professionals to be available when patients are in need; limits on 
working hours may place that professional tradition in question (Carpenter et al. 2006). 
Conversely, health professionals also commit to the ethical principle of “first do no harm” 
(Sharpe 2004), and working long hours may cause harm placing many health 
professionals in an ethically conflicted position (Carpenter et al. 2006). 
 
The professions, particularly the medical profession, are also concerned about ensuring 
the quality of the training provided to health professionals. This concern is particularly 
prevalent in the United States, where a number of critics, including some students, are 
concerned that limits on working hours (in the United States approximately eighty 
hours per week) negatively affect physician training (Green 1995; Hutter et al. 2006; 
Brunworth 2006; Cohen-Gadol et al. 2005; Barden 2002; Sakorafas 2004). In contrast, in 
the United Kingdom the Royal Colleges accept that medical training can occur 
satisfactorily within fifty-six hours per week (Pickersgill 2001; Department of Health 
2002) and in Canada an eighty hour work week is considered sufficient to meet training 
needs for physicians (Romanchuk 2004). Putting cultural factors and training issues 
together, there may be substantial pressure in some health systems to resist governance 
strategies to reduce working hours. 
 
C RESOURCE ISSUES 
Another significant challenge facing would-be regulators are concerns about the 
continued sustainability of health systems - systems confronted by increasing demand 
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and limited resources, fiscal and human. A decision to reduce working hours has an 
inevitable impact upon resources, as health systems will have to employ more health 
professionals to cover the shortfall in hours. There will be an inevitable fiscal impact, as 
costs will increase, at least in the short term, unless and until they are offset by savings 
from fewer incidents of unsafe care and lesser rates of illness, burnout, and stress 
amongst health professionals. In environments where fiscal resources are constrained, 
decision-makers face a dilemma as to whether to commit to significant up-front costs, 
which offer only the possibility, and not the certainty, of future benefit. There are also 
questions about workforce availability, as there is an international shortage of health 
professionals, a shortage exacerbated if health professionals are required to work shorter 
hours (U.K. Hansard 2003). 
 
There are also questions about the willingness of the workforce to work reduced hours. 
Working fewer hours may mean health professionals receive less pay or allowances, 
which would be of concern for health professionals whose salaries tend towards the 
lower end of the scale, for example, nurses, and for newly qualified health professionals 
with significant debt levels. Fiscal and workforce issues are not analyzed in any detail in 
this article, but are significant issues that affect the manageability and effectiveness of 
any governance regime that intends to limit health professionals working hours. 
 
 
III. OVERVIEW OF AVAILABLE REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS 
 
Governance within the health system has long reflected the central reality of public 
problem solving, namely its collaborative nature (Braithwaite, Healy, and Dwan 2005) 
due to its accommodatory base (Tuohy 1999). Governments lack expertise in the delivery 
of health services and so must accord considerable autonomy to health professionals, 
with problem solving and policy-making within the health system generally relying on 
government and third-party actors. This has generally occurred through co-regulatory 
models, but also through self-regulatory interventions supported by government 
(Braithwaite, Healy and Dwan 2005). Government use of command and control 
regulation has generally only occurred where the market, self-regulation or co-regulation 
are perceived as having failed to serve the public interest. 
 
The six countries (and one supra-national body) examined in this article generally 
employ a mix of regulatory instruments to regulate working hours. The basic 
instruments identified in this review are set out in Table 1 and the strengths and 
weaknesses of these instruments are subsequently discussed in more detail. I consider 
that a regulatory instrument is strong if it is: effective, efficient, equitable, manageable, 
and politically legitimate (Salamon 2002; Gunningham and Grabosky 1998). I define 
“effective” in simple and complex terms. The simple question is whether regulation 
reduces the working hours of health professionals; the more complex question is 
whether regulation contributes to improving the health and safety of patients and/or 
health professionals. Adapting Salamon’s (2002) definitions, an instrument is efficient if 
it reduces working hours and/or improves safety at minimum cost in an administratively 
efficient manner. It is manageable if there is relative ease in its operation (Salamon 2002). 
An instrument is equitable if it shows fairness in burden sharing between parties 
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(Salamon 2002). An instrument is politically legitimate if it supports autonomy, 
transparency, and accountability (Salamon 2002). 
 
Table 1 Basic Instruments Employed to Regulate Working Hours in Health Systems 
Instrument Type Policy Actor(s) Strengths Weaknesses 
Tort Law – medical 
malpractice / general 
negligence 
(regulation by 
litigation) 
Patients 
Public at large 
Effective for some affected 
individuals (compensation) 
Ineffective (simple & 
complex) at systems level 
Inefficient 
Inequitable 
Questionable political 
legitimacy 
Tort Law – 
employment 
(regulation by 
litigation) 
Employees Effective for affected 
individuals (compensation) 
(working conditions) 
Ineffective (simple & 
complex) at systems level 
Inefficient 
Inequitable 
Questionable political 
legitimacy 
Labour law – 
collective agreements  
(co-regulation) 
Unions/Employers Gradual implementation 
Mutual agreement 
Equitable  (if national 
agreement) 
Efficient 
Simple effectiveness 
Complex effectiveness -
improvements in worker 
health 
Manageable 
Possible inequities 
Questions of legitimacy 
Complex effectiveness - 
patient safety 
improvement uncertain 
 
Self-regulation Professional 
bodies/ 
accreditation 
agencies 
Simple effectiveness 
Complex effectiveness -
improvements in worker 
health 
Equity within group 
 
Questions of legitimacy 
Complex effectiveness - 
patient safety 
improvement uncertain 
Efficient? 
Manageable? 
Command and 
Control Regulation 
Government Equity 
Simple effectiveness 
Complex effectiveness – 
improvements in worker 
health 
Politically legitimate 
 
Complex effectiveness – 
patient safety 
improvement uncertain 
Imposed solution 
Efficient? 
Manageable? 
 
A. REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 
The adverse consequences of long working hours fall heavily on individuals. Some argue 
that it is not necessary to place limits on working hours in the health system as patients 
can sue for errors attributable to excessive hours worked by health professionals and the 
employment practices that permit them (Annas 2006).3 For example, in Australia, the 
judge in Brotherston v Royal Perth Hospital (1995) awarded substantial damages to a man 
whose permanent brain damage was a result of negligent medical treatment. The judge 
concluded that it was difficult to avoid the conclusion that the long shifts worked by 
staff, with an overwhelming workload, contributed to poor clinical management. In 
                                                 
3 New Zealand and Denmark have no-fault insurance schemes that discourage negligence claims. 
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England, the court in Wilsher v Essex Health Authority (1986) awarded damages to a baby 
whose physicians, who had been working continuously or had averaged long hours on 
call in the prior weeks, repeatedly inserted a catheter for arterial gas sampling into a vein, 
rather than an artery. The baby became blind after thirty-two hours of super-saturation 
with oxygen. The judge held the hospital liable for its failure to organize its staff 
appropriately. 
 
The public may also sue for acts of negligence that occur outside the health system, but 
that may be attributable to its management practices, for example, fatigued health 
professionals’ high rates of vehicle accidents (Barger et al. 2005). In the United States, for 
example, a physician, and the hospital the physician worked at, were sued after the 
physician rear-ended a woman’s car and seriously and permanently injured her. The 
physician was returning home after working a thirty-six hour shift (Gotbaum 2005). 
While the case proceeded against the physician, the court of first instance dismissed the 
action against the hospital stating that it did not owe a duty to a third party injured by 
an off-duty physician who allegedly experienced fatigue due to the hospital’s policy on 
working hours (Brewster v. Rush-Presbyterian - St Luke’s Medical Center (2005)). This decision 
was upheld on appeal4 (Brewster v. Rush-Presbyterian - St Luke’s Medical Center (2006)). 
 
Employees can sue employers for loss or injury caused by the adverse effects on health 
and safety of their conditions of work (Patton 2001). In the English case of Johnstone v 
Bloomsbury Health Authority (1991), for example, Dr Johnstone claimed that he suffered a 
personal injury as a result of his work schedule (including one shift of forty-nine hours, 
with seven hours sleep, and another of thirty-two hours with thirty minutes sleep). The 
Court of Appeal found that a Health Authority could not make a physician work so 
much overtime that it constituted a threat to his or her health. Lord-Justice Stuart-Smith 
stated it was “a matter of grave public concern that junior doctors should be required to 
work such long hours without proper rest that not only their own health may be put at 
risk but that of their patients as well” (ibid at 301). 
 
Tort law serves two regulatory functions: social insurance by compensation for 
individuals harmed by others (a reactive function); and deterrence, where the award of 
financial compensation creates economic incentives for defendants to implement risk 
management systems to ensure safer conduct in the future (a prospective function) 
(Sharpe 2004; Abraham 2002). Due to its prospective function, simple tort litigation can 
claim to be an instrument for regulation. For most countries, until very recently, tort 
litigation has been the primary instrument for regulating patient safety (Mello, Kelly and 
Brennan 2005), although not necessarily worker health and safety where key regulatory 
instruments are employment agreements and, to a lesser extent, occupational health and 
safety laws. From the case-law discussed above, it appears that the impact of regulation 
by litigation upon employment practices within the health system is limited in its 
effectiveness. An individual employee may directly challenge his or her employment 
conditions and effect change, at least for that health professional. Patients may argue 
working hour related fatigue as a systemic factor establishing liability of hospitals when 
                                                 
4 The Supreme Court of Illinois refused leave to appeal in 2006 (Brewster v Rush-Presbyterian St. Luke’s 
Medical Center (2006)). 
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there is evidence to support it to claim compensation, whether that results in systemic 
change is open to question. However, the limited U.S. case law in this area indicates that 
the general public will not be able to use litigation in respect of motor vehicle accidents 
to compel changes in employment practices in health sectors. This is despite empirical 
evidence that long working hours are causally connected to higher than average rates of 
motor vehicle accidents experienced by physicians returning home after work (Barger et 
al. 2005). 
 
Recent U.S. experience points even more strongly to litigation as an explicit regulatory 
instrument, which has as its goal promotion of prospective systemic change. In the 
United States, litigation may result in negotiated regulatory policies to settle suits or 
provide a lever to promote support for government action (Viscusi 2002). 
Characteristically, areas that result in what Viscusi (ibid) terms “regulation through 
litigation” are harms which generate significant numbers of high-profile individual or 
class actions, for example, tobacco, breast implants and firearms (ibid). Most countries, 
at least those with fault-based systems for medical malpractice, are experiencing a high-
profile “malpractice crisis” (Annas 2006; Mello, Kelly and Brennan 2005). The outcome 
of the malpractice “crisis” and a general awareness of patient safety costs for regulators 
generally is a renewed interest in encouraging effective self-regulation, a move to meta-
regulation and the institution of command and control models of regulation where 
required (Downie et al. 2006). Although state governments in the United States have 
aligned themselves to support individual suits as levers for policy-making or instituted 
litigation as a form of associational self-regulation (Viscusi 2002), this has not yet 
happened in respect of the regulation of working hours in health systems and is generally 
not a use of litigation contemplated in the countries examined in this article. 
 
Tort law has notable weaknesses as a regulatory instrument to promote systemic change. 
It is bottom-up in nature, as it depends upon the willingness and ability of individuals to 
seek a remedy through the sometimes torturous processes involved in taking a matter 
before a court or administrative tribunal. There are barriers to many individuals bringing 
cases before the courts, including informational and financial barriers, and for employees, 
the possibility of impaired career prospects. In the absence of action by individuals, 
courts cannot provide guidance on the expected standard of care. Even if an individual 
takes action, the matter may settle before the matter reaches the courtroom, as these are 
generally private disputes. With no transparency as to outcome, there can be no broader 
systemic change. 
 
There are a number of additional barriers to litigation achieving even simple effectiveness 
and achieving complex effectiveness is even more fraught with problems. One of the 
central arguments in support of regulation through litigation is that large damages 
awards provide a strong incentive for administrators to limit working hours on a 
cost/benefit basis (Patton, Landers and Agarwhal 2001). This effect is strongly contested 
(Danzon 1985; Mello and Brennan 2002) and any assumption of a broader effect of 
litigation on the policies and practices of other health providers is even more strongly 
contested (Mello and Brennan 2002; Mello, Kelly and Brennan 2005). In part, this is 
because all health providers, individual and institutional, carry insurance and in part 
because of a sense of defensiveness about law-suits, by physicians in particular (Mello, 
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Kelly and Brennan 2005). The uneven impact of litigation will produce inequity of 
expected working hours across the sector with the result that health professionals in 
different facilities will work in widely varying conditions, and patients will get varying 
treatment and care that may be more or less safe. Efficiency is also in question, with 
court processes resulting in slow, diffuse regulatory change, instead of coordinated 
systemic changes to enhance safety across the system (Jacobson and Soliman 2002). It is 
also unwieldy, with multiple law-suits being an inefficient manner to provoke systemic 
change. 
 
Lastly, the tort system raises questions about political legitimacy. If sectoral change is 
possible through tort litigation, do we want the courts to change employment practices 
in the sector or should another policy actor take responsibility for change? Courts often 
act in a policy capacity only when those in a position to enact a regulatory change appear 
to ignore an issue of significant public interest, such as safety (Viscusi 2002; Mello, Kelly 
and Brennan 2005). Setting aside for the moment that courts act in a reactive manner, 
courts may lack expertise when it comes to some policy issues and provide a remedy that 
is impracticable to implement, does not take into account the impact of the judgment on 
other important public policy issues, such as health human resources, or could have the 
unintended effect of worsening patient safety. Lastly, there is also a lack of transparency 
in this type of regulation, which essentially is a private negotiation to which the public 
are not privy and which may not serve the public interest. Although the ability of 
individuals to bring a suit against an institution whose employment practices result in 
harm is available, in some form or another, in all the countries examined in this article, it 
has, to date, not resulted in significant changes in employment practices across systems. 
 
B. CO-REGULATION 
In a number of settings collective associations of employees (unions) have acted, in 
negotiation with employers, to change employment conditions including reducing 
working hours. All of the countries examined in this review are able to use, or have used 
in the past, this mechanism to regulate employment conditions in health systems. 
Collective negotiations fit loosely within a model of co-regulation, where policy actors 
cooperate to create new rules for a specific context. Such negotiated policies pursue 
public and private interests. 
 
For the majority of the countries examined in this research, collective agreements were a 
viable regulatory instrument; only the United States is an outlier. Collective agreements 
were most successful in countries with a tradition of government involvement in the 
universal provision of health services. In these countries, legislative frameworks 
centralized publicly funded health services within structural frameworks at the local, 
regional, or national level. Further, the regulatory traditions within the health sectors of 
these countries were based on accommodations with professional groups, in particular 
physicians (Tuohy 1999). Therefore, the negotiation of collective agreements at a 
national or sub-national level between health professionals and government or 
government actors was an accepted part of the governance framework. In these 
circumstances, unions of health professionals often had considerable power in 
negotiations. This power was even more compelling when policy-makers were 
confronted by the monopoly these unionized professional groups had in the provision of 
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an essential service. In contrast, in the United States governments play a lesser role in the 
provision and funding of health services, with many health services provided privately by 
a multiplicity of providers and many health services directly funded by private health 
insurance plans. The presence and influence of unions in the United States health sector 
is less overt and powerful, especially in regard to physicians, than in the other countries 
examined in this research. 
 
One barrier to the effectiveness of negotiated agreements is how well parties to that 
agreement comply with it. Generally compliance with negotiated agreements is high, for 
example, in Denmark and New Zealand, the working hours of the vast majority of 
physicians affected by collective agreements decreased in line with the limits specified in 
their collective agreements, although the occasional egregious breach was reported 
(Child and Old 2004; Australian Medical Association 1998). The United Kingdom 
experienced greater levels of non-compliance with its negotiated agreement. A 1997 
examination of compliance indicated that working hours had reduced for the majority of 
physicians-in-training but 21 percent of posts did not comply with the targets for actual 
hours of work set out in the collective agreement (Australian Medical Association 1998). 
 
There is limited evidence of effectiveness in terms of improving patient safety and the 
quality of health services and of worker health and safety. In New Zealand, a 1987 
independent review for the Department of Health of current medical officer rostering 
practices assessed the impact of a collective agreement that reduced physicians-in-
trainings’ hours. The review concluded that residents were less tired and better able to 
cope than before limits were in place and that there was an improvement in some aspects 
of patient care (Smakoff and Jacques 1991). 
 
In terms of political legitimacy, co-regulatory approaches to regulation may give rise to 
concerns about conflicts of interest and regulatory capture, as such decision-making 
processes endeavor to balance public and private interests (Gunningham and Grabosky 
1998). This form of negotiation may privilege certain actors to address issues that are of 
public interest and exclude others from knowledge of or participation in negotiations. 
Negotiations and agreements may not be transparent as they may not be available, 
accessible, or made known to the public, as in New Zealand where the terms of the 
collective agreement only became public currency in the context of a bitter disagreement 
about conditions. There may also be questions about the accountability of health 
professionals, institutions, or government to the public for decisions that may have an 
impact on the safety or the quality of the care patients receive. 
 
Collective agreements are, to a degree, self-policing and therefore reduce enforcement 
costs, making them, at least in this respect, a potentially cost-effective mechanism, 
especially when compared to command and control mechanisms. In the United States, 
effective implementation of the command and control model used in New York State and 
the associational self-regulatory model implemented by the Accreditation Council for 
Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) in all other states required some investment in 
compliance mechanisms, such as the employment of inspectors. In contrast, the co-
regulatory model used in New Zealand required no financial outlay in respect of ensuring 
compliance. The level to which these mechanisms can be effectively self-policing does 
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depend to an extent on individuals informing unions of violations, and there may be 
significant barriers to this occurring, either internal or external in nature, as is discussed 
in more detail later in this article in respect of ACGME’s experience (Croasdale 2004). 
 
Collective agreements generally come into force in gradual increments that enable 
affected institutions or professions to adjust practices and adapt to change more slowly, 
while working towards an ultimate substantive reduction in hours. This approach may 
reduce resistance to change. Sometimes the pace of change can be too slow. For example, 
in New Zealand physicians-in-training have relatively recently taken strike action in 
respect of working hours claiming progress has stopped (New Zealand Press Association 
2006). However, it generally seems that for some groups, in some countries, co-
regulatory instruments have brought about real change in employment practices. 
 
C. SELF-REGULATION 
Health system management internationally is heavily reliant on health professionals and 
health providers regulating themselves (Mello, Kelly and Brennan 2005). Faith in the 
ability of health professionals to self-regulate in part relies on the professions’ adherence 
to their professional codes, which require health professionals to act in the interests of 
patients. Self-regulation is also premised upon the idea that professions (or institutions) 
have the specialized knowledge necessary to determine how best to provide clinical 
services. There are three primary self-regulatory actors in this sphere: regulatory 
colleges/councils (bodies sanctioned by government to govern the professions); 
professional associations (interest groups representing the interests of members); and 
accreditation bodies. 
 
There are various models describing hierarchies in regulation but for the purposes of this 
article I use the model of ascending hierarchies of coercion (Braithwaite, Healy and 
Dwan 2005; Gunningham and Grabosky 1998). The hierarchy begins with bottom-up 
regulatory approaches that rely on individuals or organizations to voluntarily self-
regulate to change culture and behavior at individual or systems levels. This is relatively 
uncommon, although at least one professional association is seeking to extend its 
regulatory reach through creating voluntary guidelines about working hours and 
working environments (Australian Medical Association 1999). Using guidelines as a 
mechanism to enable systemic change tends to be ineffective as compliance is voluntary 
and behavior and practices are difficult to change. Institutional accreditation bodies, 
such as the Joint Commission in the United States, do not appear to directly address 
limitations on working hours rather they may address the organizational impacts of a 
reduction in working hours indirectly, for example through handover protocols (Okie 
2007). 
 
The next step on the hierarchy is associational self-regulation, where a policy actor 
places pressure on another actor, usually through intimating it might legislate or 
instituting law suits, to encourage/compel “voluntary” self-regulation (Viscusi 2002). 
The United States arguably has employed this model, as critics suggest that government 
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pressure, whether real or imagined, influenced the U.S. body the ACGME’s5 2003 
decision to institute mandatory standards to regulate the working hours of physicians-
in-training (Bell 2003; Altman 2002; ACGME 2003). While physician groups may 
perceive co-regulatory processes as acknowledging their professional autonomy, they 
may perceive associational self-regulation as undermining it. It may be perceived as the 
imposition of a regulatory framework that may not take into account professional values 
or the resource constraints within which professionals must operate (Kagan and Scholz 
1984). This may explain why many U.S. physicians strongly oppose the ACGME’s 
standards. Associative self-regulation may therefore be more likely to be ineffective both 
in simple and complex terms. Although such regulation is likely to be equitable, as 
standards generally have national scope, it is also likely to be inefficient because of high 
compliance costs. 
 
The third level in the hierarchy is state-sanctioned self-regulation, where the state 
delegates coercive powers of top-down regulation to the profession(s) to self-govern. 
Empowering legislation generally requires regulatory councils to address specific issues 
related to the functioning of the profession. These include registration, matters of 
professional practice and conduct, and, at times, the development of ethical standards for 
the profession. The expressed purpose of most regulatory councils in legislation is 
protection of the public (Downie et al. 2006). Despite this clear statement of purpose, 
and evidence of the impact of long working hours on the safety of the public, regulatory 
councils/colleges in the countries reviewed appear not to have created any policies about 
this issue or indeed to have acknowledged the issue. At the micro level, disciplinary 
tribunals of the regulatory councils/colleges address individual cases where fatigue is 
alleged to have contributed to misconduct, with whatever macro-level deterrent effect 
that this might have. For example, in Medical Board of Queensland v Doneman (2004) the 
Tribunal held that the requirement that the physician work long hours must have 
contributed to his ability to “properly manage” the patient’s condition. It concluded “if 
this tragedy leads to nothing else, it should lead to the abolition of such brutally long 
shift hours, which must in itself reduce the standard of care available to patients” (ibid.: 
para. 6). There are also concerns about the legitimacy of self-regulation, as it may raise 
concerns about conflicts of interest (perceived institutional reluctance to monitor peers 
and enforce sanctions), public accountability and about the transparency of processes 
(Ogus 1995; Anonymous 2002). 
 
Last in the hierarchy is “meta-regulation” where government agencies require and 
oversee self-regulatory action (Grabosky 1995; Gunningham and Grabosky 1998). 
Despite a governance trend internationally away from professional, or institutional, self-
regulation of issues pertaining to patient safety towards meta-regulation (Downie et al. 
2006), governments, at least in the countries reviewed for this article, have not instigated 
any form of meta-regulation in respect of working hours. Meta-regulation encompasses 
meta-risk-management schemes, enforced quality improvement, or enforced self-
regulation (Braithwaite, Healy and Dwan 2005). Potential advantages of this approach 
                                                 
5 ACGME is a private professional organization responsible for the accreditation of medical training 
programs – it is a pure self-regulatory body in that government does not officially sanction its operations, 
functions, and powers through the passage of empowering legislation. 
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are that it accords sufficient flexibility to address local circumstances, while at the same 
time setting a minimum standard to ensure safety. It is also transparent and ensures 
accountability. Meta-regulatory approaches to limiting working hours are currently in 
place in some, non-health related, sectors with varying accounts of their success 
(Downie et al. 2006). 
 
Aside from collective efforts in respect of employment conditions, professional self-
regulation of long working hours has been somewhat limited.  It may be that self-
regulatory bodies are inactive because of conflict within the profession about the 
necessity, or desirability, of limiting working hours. Inaction may also be a tacit 
acknowledgement that other actors are better equipped to address this issue, or other 
policy actors have, however, imperfectly, already addressed it. 
 
D. COMMAND AND CONTROL REGULATION 
One of governments’ responsibilities is to mitigate risks to the public health and safety 
where possible. This does not mean government must always directly intervene; if there 
are existing successful governance mechanisms put in place by another policy actor no 
action may be necessary. A failure by other policy actors to take action is a problem for 
government. Indeed, the failure of the profession to act appropriately was one expressed 
rationale for U.S. federal legislators introducing legislation to limit working hours 
(Patient and Physician Safety and Protection Act 2005). As Walshe notes, the problem 
with relying on voluntarist types of regulation is that actors may be constrained from 
implementing internal change due to very real environmental and cultural issues (2003), 
whereas command and control regulation instructs the regulated to operate within those 
constraints. 
 
Command and control regulation can rely on voluntary compliance of the regulated if 
regulators consider them to be “responsible political actors” to use terminology from 
Kagan and Scholz’s typology (1984), or “virtuous” actors to use Braithwaite’s description 
(2002), and so likely to comply. Given the ethical commitments of health providers to 
“first do no harm” (Sharpe 2004) and that violators would pay a heavy price in any 
litigation establishing fatigue as a causative factor in error regulators could perhaps 
assume responsibility and virtuosity. However, there are other countervailing factors 
such as culture, resourcing, and autonomy. Kagan and Scholz (1984) suggest that non-
compliance results when the regulated consider regulation unreasonable. The tendency 
of health professionals and health administrators to ignore or manipulate laws they do 
not agree with or cannot comply with is well-known (Eastman and Peay 1999; Walshe 
2003). Thus, legislation of this type may require investment in compliance measures to 
ensure simple effectiveness, increasing costs and adding to manageability issues. 
 
Generally, command and control regulation is considered an effective mechanism, both 
in terms of achieving desired safety outcomes and as a tool to ensure consistency across a 
sector or across multiple jurisdictions. Gunningham and Johnstone (1999) and 
Gunningham and Grabosky (1998) note that command and control regulation remains 
an effective instrument to improve health and safety in some contexts. The question 
must remain whether it will be equally effective in this context given the complexity of 
health systems. In contrast with other systems, in health systems health and safety risks 
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are not just to employees but also to patients. Regulators may also see command and 
control regulation as a better option for when they want, as in the example of the 
European Union, to implement cross-sectoral change, as it ensures consistency of 
approaches between sectors and between countries and equity of treatment. 
 
One of the important functions of legislation is its symbolic effect in sending a signal that 
some employment practices create unacceptable health and safety risks (Gunningham 
and Grabosky 1998). Legislation sets clear expectations about working hours and 
enables accountability both of the regulated for performance and the regulators for a lack 
of monitoring and enforcement (Gunningham and Grabosky 1998). In New York State, 
revelations that most facilities were ignoring legislated limits on working hours 
compelled substantive change to the practice of regulators to ensure that the regulated 
were publicly accountable for their lack of compliance. A legislative scheme may be 
transparent, especially if regulators publicly report compliance, as is the case in New 
York State. To the extent a legislative schema depends upon reporting of abuses by 
health professionals, it is vulnerable to criticisms, discussed previously, that are leveled 
at any reporting scheme (Croasdale 2004). 
 
Perhaps the strongest criticism is that law is a blunt instrument incapable of adequately 
addressing complex issues relating to the management of individuals who work highly 
complex, highly integrated jobs, driven by unexpected emergent human needs. Critics 
argue that the nature of patient care means that sudden emergencies may arise or 
treatment may prove more complex than initially expected, and the patient’s life may be 
at risk if physicians are less attentive because their shift is about to end (Steinbrook 
2002). An examination of actual regulatory instruments within and outside of health 
systems in relation to working hours confirms that legislation need not be inflexible, as 
some legislation imports qualifying words allowing overrides in emergency situations 
(Downie et al. 2006). Regulation can also be crafted so that enforcement strategies, at 
least initially, fall within the compliance (education and negotiation), rather than 
deterrence (punishment), model of enforcement (Day and Klein 1987). Whether and 
when inspectors move from compliance to deterrence strategies will depend on the 
interpretative judgment of the regulator as to the behavior of the regulated i.e. whether 
the regulated are deliberately trying to subvert the system or whether they are genuinely 
constrained by the environment in which they function (Kagan and Scholz 1984; Day and 
Klein 1987). There is precedent for the use of command and control regulation in 
complex areas and its relative effectiveness, and a place for law when other policy actors 
fail to act to preserve the public interest (Gunningham and Grabosky 1998). 
 
 
IV CURRENT REGULATORY CONFIGURATIONS  
 
An examination of the process of regulation demonstrates that once policy actors 
accepted that long working hours were a problem, whether because of concerns about 
the welfare of workers or the safety of patients, no country has employed a single 
instrument model. There are three general macro-level approaches to this issue displayed 
in the configurations of regulation demonstrated in each country, or transnational block, 
and these are illustrated in Figure 1 in order of the degree of coercion involved. 
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Figure 1: Configurations of Regulatory Approaches to Limiting Working Hours 
   
 
A. UNITED STATES (EXCEPT NEW YORK STATE) 
In the United States, until very recently, the only mechanism through which to regulate 
the working hours of health professionals was when individuals used tort law, except in 
New York State. If changes to employment practices have resulted from litigation, they 
remain facility specific. 
 
For historically contingent reasons, collective mechanisms were not available to 
physicians-in-training until 1999. In Boston Medical Center Corporation v. House Officers’ 
Association / Committee of Interns and Residents (1999) the National Labor Board overturned 
twenty years of precedent and recognized that physicians-in-training were employees, 
allowing them the right to collective bargaining. Despite this, collective negotiations 
appear infrequent, with the Committee of Interns and Residents, the largest medical 
resident union in the United States, representing only 12 percent of all physicians-in-
training (Butterfield 2007). 
 
The primary mode of regulation in the United States is associational self-regulation 
through the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME). ACGME 
must accredit training facilities in order for those facilities to gain government funding. 
In 2003, ACGME introduced Resident Duty Hours Standards as part of its criteria for 
accreditation.6 Critics noted that the introduction of the standards coincided with 
proposed federal legislation to limit working hours for physicians-in-training7 because of 
patient safety concerns and a petition by physicians-in-training asking the federal 
Occupational Health and Safety Administration to intervene, which it declined to do 
(Bell 2003; Altman and Grady 2002). ACGME said that it regulated working hours as 
                                                 
6 The U.S. government spends about $8 billion dollars per year to train residents. 
7 A federal bill placing restrictions on the hours nurses may work in federally funded institutions was also 
introduced at the same time as the bill relating to physicians-in-training. The latest incarnations of these 
Bills were the Patient and Physician Safety and Protection Act of 2005 which lapsed at the committee stage 
and the Safe Nursing and Patient Care Act of 2007 which has recently been reintroduced after a previous 
bill lapsed. 
 
 
Configuration one  Configuration two  Configuration three 
 
United States    Australia, Canada, N.Z.  European Union/New York State 
(Except NY State) 
 
Regulation by litigation  Regulation by litigation  Regulation by litigation 
Self-regulation    Limited self-regulation  Limited self-regulation 
    Co-regulation   Legislation 
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training facilities had implemented service cuts, because of shorter hospital stays, 
technological advances, and financial pressures, which resulted in increased pressure for 
physicians-in-training to work longer hours, thus jeopardizing the quality of care 
provided to patients and the standard of education provided to physicians-in-training 
(ACGME 2003). It is important to note that ACGME’s decision occurred in a policy 
climate where the IOM’s report on the scope and nature of the patient safety problem in 
U.S. health systems had received national attention and become a national priority 
(1998). It was patient safety rather than any overwhelming anxiety about occupational 
safety and health that prompted regulation in the United States. 
 
The ACGME scheme is of particular interest, as it is a self-regulatory scheme that is 
mandatory in nature, but instituted as the result of (real or perceived) pressure from 
government. ACGME faced much opposition to its introduction and it remains 
controversial, with critics complaining about its effect on the quality of medical 
education and claiming negative impacts on patient care (see e.g. Cohen-Gadol et al. 
2005; Brunworth and Sindawi 2006; Carpenter et al. 2006). The evidence of simple 
effectiveness in terms of reduction in working hours is mixed. Although many programs 
are broadly compliant with the new standards, some few remain non-compliant (see e.g. 
ACGME 2006). ACGME conducts pre-arranged site visits every three years and reports 
it is seeing evidence that some logbooks recording work hours are being “fudged” 
indicating a degree of resistance to the standards (Croasdale 2004). Physicians-in-
training report that a significant number feel compelled, primarily, they state, out of 
ethical concern for patients, to exceed the ACGME standards and to falsify records to 
obscure this (Carpenter et al. 2006). 
 
In terms of complex effectiveness, there are also reservations about whether the ACGME 
governance regime is effective. A recent examination of error rates in obstetrics and 
gynecology before and after implementation of the ACGME guidelines concludes that 
physician-in-training work hour restrictions show minimal evidence of improvement in 
quality of care (Bailit and Blanchard 2004). Physicians-in-training and the physicians 
who supervise them also report perceptions that the quality and safety of the services 
provided to patients have diminished after the introduction of the ACGME standards 
(see e.g. Carpenter et al. 2006; Cohen-Gadol 2005; Brunworth 2006). Even assuming 
hours have reduced, there is still a question as to whether the reduction is sufficient to 
address issues of employee health with some critics concerned that the maximum hours 
are still too long (Parshurum et al.. 2004; American Medical Student Association 2005). 
 
In terms of both equity and manageability concerns remain. The ACGME standards have 
an opt-out clause for some programs for “educational reasons.” Exploiting this some 
specialties may be able to work still longer hours resulting in inequitable treatment of 
physicians-in-training, depending on their specialty (i.e., surgical trainees versus 
medical) or the hospital or region that they work in. The manageability of the regulatory 
schema is also in question since ACGME relies on physicians-in-training to report 
violations of the standards. A significant issue not addressed by ACGME, and which is 
the bane of all reporting programs, is how to overcome systemic and cultural barriers 
that actively discourage reporting. Physicians-in-training may face repercussions for 
reporting as ACGME does not provide whistleblower protections (Hexom 2004). The 
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only penalty the ACGME can impose against violators is loss of accreditation. While loss 
of accreditation is highly stigmatizing for an institution, it may also negatively impact 
upon the careers and prospects of those in training in that institution discouraging 
reporting (Croasdale 2004). Loss of accreditation is also such a serious penalty that there 
may be some hesitation on the part of the ACGME to apply it. The ACGME has had 
some form of work hour restrictions in place since 1987, but, despite a significant number 
of citations, (ACGME 2006)8 only one program lost accreditation.9 Despite promising to 
aggressively monitor compliance with the standards, there remain concerns about the 
conflict of interest faced by ACGME (Bell 2003; Anonymous 2002). A critic noted that 
 
“Despite tough talk, the council faces an inherent conflict of interest. Its board is 
dominated by the trade associations for hospitals, doctors and medical schools, all 
of which benefit from the cheap labor provided by medical residents.” (Anonymous 
2002: A36). 
 
In addition, critics argue that “the use of public dollars to fund graduate medical 
education should require public accountability” (Boodman 2001: H01). ACGME does not 
make public statements about why it is withdrawing accreditation or placing a program 
on probation, so there is limited accountability to the public which funds the training 
programs (Hexom 2004) and little transparency. 
 
Self-regulation can be an important instrument for regulatory change. However, in this 
case, when the regulated perceived regulation as being imposed upon the profession 
because of government pressure there was significant opposition to the standards. This 
opposition undermined regulatory effectiveness. Opposition did not only relate to the 
manner in which working hours were regulated, but also the fact that it was felt 
necessary to regulate the issue at all. As noted earlier, in the United States, the culture of 
the medical profession was generally one where working long hours is considered 
essential to good medical practice and to effective professional training. Elements of the 
profession were unhappy that regulation altered these, as they saw it, core professional 
values. Additionally, the pressure to regulate implied that the profession was not 
rigorous in upholding its core ethical value “first do no harm” and thus was not a good 
ethical actor. These factors point to the need to have at least some support from key 
policy actors within the health professions before implementing regulatory change. 
 
B. AUSTRALIA, CANADA, NEW ZEALAND 
Regulation through litigation is an instrument used to regulate working hours in 
Australia and Canada. It is much more limited in its scope in New Zealand, as New 
Zealand’s no-fault system precludes courts from awarding compensatory damages for 
physical injuries. In Australia, the professional associations cite the litigation cases when 
bargaining and when campaigning for system wide change to support their position 
(Australian Medical Association 1999). 
 
                                                 
8 One in five failed to comply with duty hour requirements in 1999 with compliance improving slightly in 
2000. 
9 The Yale surgical program lost accreditation in 2001. It regained (provisional) accreditation in 2002. 
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Self-regulation of working hours by regulatory councils/colleges or professional 
associations is minimal in these countries, most likely because of their dependence upon 
co-regulation. Regulatory councils/colleges consider issues related to working hours in 
the context of disciplinary hearings into the practice of individual health professionals 
(e.g. Medical Board of Queensland v Doneman 2004). A limited example of voluntary self-
regulation is the Australian Medical Association guidelines (as discussed above) 
(Australian Medical Association 1999). 
 
Co-regulatory agreements through the process of collective bargaining are the primary 
instrument used to regulate working hours in these countries. The focus of these 
agreements is primarily, although not exclusively, to ensure occupational health and 
safety. These agreements are sector and profession specific, and involve a cooperative 
engagement between policy actors, generally professional associations, government, at 
the national or state/provincial level, or other government agents such as the District 
Health Boards in New Zealand. However, the negotiation processes have illustrated the 
tensions inherent in regulation where the parties may be in conflicted positions. In New 
Zealand, for example, physicians-in-training went on strike in 2006, claiming progress in 
reducing hours was too slow, probably due to government resource limitations (New 
Zealand Press Association 2006). In this case, those acting for government presumably 
wanted to improve occupational health and patient safety, as is its duty as an employer, 
yet these interests are in conflict with the overarching need to contain the national and 
regional budgets for health services. 
 
The effectiveness of these agreements remains somewhat of an open question. Generally, 
co-regulatory instruments achieve simple effectiveness due to three factors: the 
prompting of a reevaluation of professional practice, a broad base of agreement between 
parties, and gradual implementation. In these countries, professional practice norms 
were reevaluated either as part of or prior to negotiation processes. The profession 
concluded that there were occupational health and safety issues for professionals, safety 
and quality issues for patients, and issues relating to adequacy of training associated 
with long working hours. The professions concluded that a reduction in working hours 
was acceptable or indeed desirable and that training could occur successfully within a 
reduced span of hours (the Royal Colleges in the United Kingdom concluded that 
training could be delivered successfully in fifty-six hours), a perspective that government 
agreed with. Because the professions accepted that change was required, there were few 
divisions between physicians and physicians-in-training and in at least one country, 
New Zealand, the professional association representing senior physicians was privy to 
collective bargaining negotiations. This is in contrast with the United States where no 
such reevaluation has occurred and schisms remain within the medical profession about 
the need to reduce working hours. Lastly, co-regulatory agreements have tended to result 
in gradual implementation of agreements enabling time for health providers to adjust 
practices by, for example, recruiting additional staff and changing rostering practices. 
 
However, co-regulation is not without its problems and so the picture is not entirely 
rosy. Certainly, there remains only sparse evidence about complex effectiveness. There is 
some limited evidence that occupational health improves and quality and safety of health 
services improves (Smakoff and Jacques 1991). Further, there have been problems with 
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compliance. The experience in the United Kingdom, where, as discussed above, 
compliance with the “New Deal” agreement was approximately 80 percent indicates that 
compliance is difficult for health providers to achieve where there are shortages in 
human resources. There have also been problems with the agreements not achieving the 
desired reductions in working hours. New Zealand is not the only country where 
professional associations have expressed frustration. In Australia in 2002, the Australian 
Council of Trade Unions brought a test case, the Working Hours Case (2002), challenging 
mandatory overtime provisions on behalf of a number of collective agreements (including 
the Northern Territory Medical Officers) before the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission.10 The Commission recognized that employees have the right to refuse to 
work overtime where it would result in the “working of unreasonable hours” (Working 
Hours Case: para. 287). It is not clear what impact this award right has had on working 
conditions for the employees in the collective agreements involved, or whether this has 
altered the health system’s employment practices at the macro level. After all, the court 
does not ban overtime, it merely creates a right for employees to refuse overtime – a right 
that some health providers, especially those in training, may not feel they can exercise, 
even with the backing of a union. It is also worthy of note that this award only addresses 
overtime – it does not address excessively long scheduled working hours. 
 
In these countries, the relative success of co-regulation as an instrument to limit working 
hours was contingent on environments that facilitated such agreements. Co-regulation 
through collective agreement has long formed part of the regulatory landscape in these 
countries. Unions have established relationships with their co-regulatory partners, and 
have some real influence in health systems built on accommodatory principles. Perhaps 
most importantly, the common characteristic of all these countries, and in the United 
Kingdom and Denmark when they used co-regulatory schemes, is the greater 
involvement of government in the funding and provision of health services and, 
accordingly, governments’ influence in the negotiation of public-sector-focused 
collective agreements. 
 
C. EUROPEAN UNION AND NEW YORK STATE 
Regulation through litigation and command and control regulation are the primary 
instruments used to place limitations on working hours in the health systems in the 
European Union and in New York State. Recourse to regulation by litigation enables 
redress for those harmed,11 as changes to working practices as a result of litigation, if any, 
are invisible at a sectoral level, although they may impact specific health providers. In 
common with the other jurisdictions examined in this article, self-regulation plays a very 
limited role at the micro-level in relation to specific cases. 
 
The rationale for the introduction of command and control regulation in respect of this 
issue differed markedly between New York State and the European Union. New York 
introduced legislation to revise section 405 of the New York State Health Code in 1989 
after the death of a patient in a New York hospital (New York State Health Code 
                                                 
10 The Australian Industrial Relations Commission is a national tribunal dealing with employment issues. 
11 Denmark has a no-fault system for harms caused by treatment received in the health system. 
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2004).12 A grand jury examining the circumstances surrounding the death found fault 
with a system that routinely allowed physicians-in-training to work more than 100 hours 
per week, for continuous periods of thirty to forty hours. The grand jury found that over-
worked, sleep-deprived physicians-in-training, and a lack of supervision, were serious 
potential dangers for patients and that the methods for training physicians were 
“counterproductive to providing quality medical care” (New York Supreme Court 1986; 
Bell 2003). The New York legislation was a reactive response to a specific incident that 
highlighted patient safety issues. New York State is not alone in the United States in 
considering command and control regulation to address this issue. One U.S. territory, 
Puerto Rico13 also has legislation, a number of states are considering enacting similar 
legislation, including Massachusetts, Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and 
California, and there have been, so far unsuccessful, federal legislative initiatives to 
address working hours issues in health care (Patient and Physician Safety and Protection 
Act of 2005; Safe Nursing and Patient Care Act of 2007). 
 
In contrast, the European Union focused on protecting occupational health and safety 
across all sectors; as a matter of policy, no employee working in any sector should be 
subject to the deleterious effects of working unduly long hours unless they voluntarily 
choose to. Limitations on working hours in the health sector were not the focus of 
regulation but a by-product of a general reform of working conditions. The European 
Commission passed the European Working Time Directive in 1993 (93/104/EC). The 
U.K. parliament incorporated the Directive into law in England as the Working Time 
Regulations 1998. The Working Time Directive limited working time to a maximum of 
forty-eight hours per week by November 1996 for selected groups, including nurses and 
the medical profession, except physicians-in-training, but allowed for individual opt-
outs. It subsequently became clear that on-call-hours count towards the working hour 
week when the European Court of Justice gave its rulings in Landeshauptstadt Kiel v Norbert 
Jaeger (2003) and Sindicato de Médicos de Asistencia Pública (Simap) v Conselleria de Sanidad y 
Consumo de la Generalidad Valenciana (2001). In 2000, the European Union amended the 
Working Time Directive (2000/34/EC) to include previously excluded groups. The 
United Kingdom passed the Working Time Amendment Regulations 2003, with 
application to physicians-in-training from 2004. The Working Hours Directive allowed 
for gradual implementation and advance notice for the regulated to enable planning for 
implementation. The welfare focus of the European Directive may explain why the 
European Union has the strictest limitations on working hours of all the countries 
examined in this article, with all health professionals being required to work a maximum 
of fifty-six hours per week reducing to forty-eight by 2009. 
 
These initiatives have received mixed reviews in terms of effectiveness. The most 
significant problem illustrated by the experiences in New York was a lack of compliance 
– there were no compliance mechanisms built into the original legislation. In 1998, the 
                                                 
12 Libby Zion was an 18 year old woman who died in a New York hospital in 1984. Her father claimed she 
had received inadequate care from overworked and under-supervised junior medical staff and that this 
caused her death. 
13 An Act to Regulate the Work Shifts of medical interns and residents in Puerto Rico [2003] P.R. Laws 47. 
An English translation is available online at: American Medical Student Association 
<http://www.amsa.org/hp/rwh_pr.doc>. 
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New York State Department of Health conducted a four-day unannounced investigation 
of twelve hospitals across New York State. All had violated the physician-in-training 
working hour limits. The department reported that: 37 percent of physicians-in-training 
worked more than eighty-five hours per week; 20 percent exceeded ninety-five hours per 
week; 60 percent of surgical residents exceeded ninety-five hours per week and 38 
percent of physicians-in-training worked in excess of twenty-four hours per shift (Kwan 
and Levy 2004. Physicians-in-training also reported busy on-call time with limited rest 
(ibid). In 2002, 66 percent of hospitals surveyed were not in compliance with the 
regulations. Fifty-six percent violated the twenty-four hour shift requirements, 34 
percent violated the eighty hours per week requirements, 23 percent did not provide 
twenty-four hours off, and 13 percent did not provide the required hours off between 
shifts (Lawrence 2003). Some felt that poor compliance with the New York law was due 
to the minor penalty, a maximum $2,000 fine, and a lack of enforcement by regulators. 
Figures from the United Kingdom also indicate that the Working Time Regulations 
made little impact upon the working hours of consultants and other physicians 
(MacDonald 2004). A recent study shows that one quarter of the working conditions of 
some positions conflict with the regulations but there have been no prosecutions (ibid). 
One concern is that the Health and Safety Executive does not appear to have enough 
inspectors or time to enforce the legislation (ibid). 
 
When investigation revealed the deficits in the effectiveness of the New York law, 
government enacted the Health Care Reform Act of 2000 to strengthen the penalties to 
up to $50,000 for repeat violations. The Act included increased capacity in respect of 
enforcement and transparency measures. Subsequently the state hired an investigation 
agency to make yearly surprise visits to teaching hospitals, to issue an annual report, and 
to publish a yearly compliance report.14 In 2002, 60 percent of hospitals had one non-
compliant program but most subsequently achieved compliance (Lawrence 2003). In 
New York, the reduction of the working hours of health professionals required the 
enactment of legislation, and, most importantly, it required that the law was enforced. 
 
The evidence in regard to complex effectiveness is also equivocal. Three studies 
examined the impact of the New York legislation. Researchers undertook a comparative 
study of the quality of care received by patients in October 1988 (when no work 
limitations were in place) and October 1989 (after work limitations were in place) (Laine 
et al.. 1993). The study concluded that limited working hours were associated with 
delayed test ordering and increased complication rates, although these did not result in 
statistically significant differences in more serious outcomes, that is, in-hospital 
mortality, transfer to intensive care, discharge disposition, or length of stay. Another 
study, also in 1989, reported no difference in mortality, morbidity, or unexpected 
transfers after implementation of the section 405 amendments (Daiger, Welliver, and 
Stapleton 1990). A third study noted reductions in mortality in 1991, but there were 
reductions in both teaching and non-teaching hospitals suggesting that the new section 
405 law could not be responsible (Howard, Silber and Jobes 2004). As the legislation 
                                                 
14 New York State closed down Mt Sinai’s living donor adult liver transplant program for one year after a 
patient died citing breaches of the 405 regulations (especially in regard to supervision and staffing levels). 
Mt Sinai lost $70 million (U.S.) as a consequence. 
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was still new when these studies were undertaken some teething problems in 
transitioning to a position where physicians worked fewer hours was inevitable, so the 
results must be interpreted with some caution. In addition, many facilities ignored the 
legislation until 1998. In short, there appears no empirical evidence that patient safety 
improved or declined in New York State as a consequence of these reforms. 
 
Although the Working Hours Directive had at its base a concern for the health and 
safety of workers, its implementation in England was influenced by concerns about 
patient safety. A 2005 report from England suggests that a National Health Service 
response to the Working Hours Amendment Regulations “A Hospital at Night” (which 
was a model of shift patterns and staffing mix), delivered improvements to patient care 
(Mahon 2005). This was a qualitative assessment based on the perceptions of involved 
health professionals. The report’s authors noted that most health professionals said that 
they prioritized acutely ill patients presenting at night so that physicians that were more 
alert saw patients faster. Respondents also felt that there were fewer patient safety 
incidents as there was more oversight of physicians-in-training by a senior nurse and 
more health professionals attended to each patient. The report also noted that 
respondents felt that reducing hours had no detrimental effect on physicians’ training or 
on the achievement of national performance targets (ibid). 
 
 
V. SCOPE OF REGULATORY LIMITATIONS ON WORKING HOURS 
 
One of the marked variances between the countries/supra-national bodies examined 
during the course of this research was in the outcome of regulatory processes to limit 
working hours. Every country or supra-national body has established different 
parameters for working hours (Table 2). 
 
Table 2 Regulatory Limitations on Working Hours of Physicians-in-Training 
Countries /  
Supra-National 
Bodies 
Weekly hours Continuous duty time Days Off 
Australia Varies from state to state Varies from state to state Varies from 
state to state 
Canada 70-80 hours  24 hours + handover 1 in 7 
European Union 
(UK; Denmark) 
58 hours (reducing to 48 hours by 
2009) 
13 hours 1 in 7 or 2 in 14 
New York State 80 hours (averaged over 4 weeks) 12 hours (Emergency) 24 
hours all other specialties 
1 in 7 
New Zealand 56-58 hours 16 hours 1 in 7 
United States 
(except NY) 
80 hours (averaged over 4 weeks 
with 10 percent increase providing 
sound educational rationale) 
30 hours (24 duty + 6 hours 
for continuity of care and 
educational activities) 
1 in 7 (averaged 
over four 
weeks) 
 
Comparing the extreme ends of the working hour spectrum there is a forty hour per 
week difference between the eighty-eight hours permitted in the United States (except 
for New York State) and the European Union’s goal of forty-eight hours (which will be 
in place by 2009). There is an eighteen-hour difference in the maximum shift that 
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physicians working in emergency departments in New York State may work compared 
with their colleagues elsewhere in the United States. Such significant differences are 
troubling given that the problem that these regulatory initiatives are addressing is the 
same. Overall, limits on working hours in North America (Canadian and U.S. schemas 
(the proposed federal, New York State, and ACGME’s national associational self-
regulation)) are substantially higher than the limits in the other countries or the supra-
national body examined for the purposes of this research. 
 
So what possible explanations could account for these differences? A cursory 
examination would suggest that differences in regulatory imperatives are significant. The 
primary influence on the regulation of working hours in the United States was concern 
about patient safety; whereas working hours regulation elsewhere was driven primarily 
by concerns about occupational health and safety. However, as an explanation this is 
inadequate as the regulatory imperatives in Canada, where the working hours 
limitations are substantially similar to the United States, were primarily to improve 
occupational health. Additionally, as a co-regulatory process established Canada’s 
working hours limitations, whereas the U.S. levels were established by legislation in 
New York State and associational self-regulation in the rest of the United States, 
instrument choice does not appear to have dictated similarities in regulatory outcomes. 
 
Instead, two factors may determine outcomes: a desire for consistency between 
neighboring jurisdictions; and perhaps that the culture of the medical profession in 
North America differs substantively from that in Europe and Australasia. While cultural 
issues are notoriously difficult to identify, the rhetoric surrounding working hours seems 
to point to three substantive points of difference in the cultures of medicine in these 
countries. The first point of difference seems to be in the interpretation of the nature of 
the ethical obligations owed to patients. One perspective considers that a professional’s 
obligations to patients can best be served if the professional is mindful of his or her 
physical limitations. The other perspective, common in the United States, appears to be 
that the patient’s interests are best served through continuity in care, no matter what 
physical or psychological burden this places on the health provider. The second point of 
difference relates to the nature of the process of training physicians. Quality rather than 
quantity appears the guiding principle in Europe, whereas quantity equals quality could 
be characterized as the position held by many in the United States. The third point of 
difference appears to be differing contexts of professional practice. Government and the 
professions work closely to ensure the functioning of the health system in most of the 
countries examined in this research, with the exception of the United States. In the acute 
sector in Australia, New Zealand, Denmark, and the United Kingdom, many physicians 
are salaried employees of government or government agencies. In Canada, governments 
fund health services but physicians are independent contractors earning fee for service 
payments. In the United States, the provision of health services by physicians is even 
more commercial in orientation. The medical profession’s sense of autonomy in its 
professional practice in non-North American countries may be tempered by an 
appreciation of the nature of relationships within the health system and with 
government and government actors. In contrast, the relative autonomy of the medical 
professions in North America may be significant in explaining why the professions are 
reluctant to place greater limitations on working hours. 
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VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
The consensus amongst all the countries and the supra-national body examined in this 
review is that they must place some limits on the hours worked by health professionals, 
especially physicians-in-training. They also concur, some more recently than others, that 
regulation by litigation as a single instrument is insufficient to serve the public interest 
in assuring the health and safety of health professionals, patients, and the public more 
generally. Thus, they must supplement regulation by litigation with other instruments to 
achieve desired policy outcomes. It is at this point that the consensus ends, as different 
jurisdictions use different supplementary instruments. What does seem clear from the 
experiences of the jurisdictions examined in this article is that the socio-political 
cultures of the countries are a determinant of instrument choice. The majority of the 
countries examined in this report have systems that government largely funds and/or 
administers. Implementing limits on working hours by co-regulation through collective 
bargaining appears to be the instrument of choice for this cohort. In these countries, 
health professionals are unionized and negotiations in respect of employment conditions 
are part of the fabric of these health systems. Denmark and the United Kingdom only 
departed from this model due to their supra-national obligations. The European Union 
requires consistency between member states and is committed to reforming work 
environments to ensure health and safety. In contrast, government’s role as a funder or 
administrator is less pervasive in the United States and collective negotiations are not 
part of the fabric of its health systems with their more individualized and profit driven 
focus. Thus, instrument choice is limited to encouraging self-regulation, generally 
through threatening professional autonomy or by imposing command and control 
regulation. 
 
Further, the experiences of the countries under review indicate that perceptions of 
professional practice norms are a determinant of instrument effectiveness, at least in 
simple terms. In all countries but the United States, there is consensus within the 
profession that lower hours of work are appropriate or indeed required to address health 
and safety concerns and that the training of health professions is not adversely affected, 
and may be improved, by imposing such limits. In contrast, the debate rages in the 
United States as to whether limits on working hours are required. Within the 
professions in the United States, there is dissension about conflicting ethical obligations, 
issues in relation to training, and in respect of what is good practice. The degree of 
resistance experienced in the United States to self-regulation, and indeed to command 
and control regulation, appears to have its roots in dissension, rather than pure resource 
constraints. The U.S. experience indicates that a regulatory instrument will be 
undermined where the aims of the regulators do not have the broad support of the 
profession and where individuals are confronted with internal and external pressures 
and expectations to act contrary to those aims. These factors may be as intangible but 
powerful as professional culture or as tangible as human resource shortages that mean 
that facilities are simply not able to recruit sufficient staff to comply with the limitations. 
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Regulation may achieve complex effectiveness in terms of the safety and well-being of 
workers; however, its record in respect of improving the quality and safety of healthcare 
is equivocal. This is because of the interrelated processes that comprise patient care so 
that when one element changes (i.e., physician working hours are reduced) other 
processes must also change, otherwise the safety and quality of the care will be reduced. 
Rigorous internal processes and innovation must accompany regulations to reduce 
working hours to ensure that patient safety and quality care are, at the very least, not 
compromised, if not enhanced. 
 
As a final comment, the experiences of these countries in the regulation of working hours 
indicate the challenges faced by regulators, but also by the regulated. At the macro level, 
regulators balance the public interest in protecting the safety of patients and the health 
and safety of health professionals against the very real and equally compelling issues of 
resource management in the health system. Perhaps the most notable resource issue is 
the international scarcity of health professionals, a problem projected to grow worse as 
the century, even the decade, progresses. At the micro level, health professionals’ ethical 
and moral obligations to do no harm and their interest in ensuring that workplace 
conditions promote health and safety are counter-balanced by issues about the nature of 
professional service to patients and economic interests. A fine balance indeed. 
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